Project Summary
Introduction
Collective choice occurs when groups of individuals, nations, neural assemblies, or more generally "agents" aggregate information or participate in group decision making. The goal is to select one alternative among many. If each agent is entitled to one vote, an obvious and common method for finding a winning alternative is to choose the one receiving the most votes. This procedure, called the Plurality procedure, is the one typically implemented in "winner-take-all" networks. Unfortunately, in noisy or controversial choices, this winner may represent the opinions of only a very small percent of the population. If such a winner were challenged head-to-head by another alternative in a pair-wise contest, the outcome frequently will be different (Saari, 1991.) A more realistic scenario assumes voters (or agents) have some minimal information about the set of choices (Runkel, 1956) , and use this information to decide for whom to vote (Saari, 1994.) Some of this information may be in the form of institutional constraints (Schelling, 1971; Young, 1998.) In these cases, voters will have a model of at least part of the choice set. Unlike the Plurality procedure, alternative choices now play an important role in the vote, for example when first choices are thwarted or not viable. When such information is 6 incorporated into a tally, two maximum likelihood methods for aggregating votes are the Borda Count (Borda, 1786) and the Condorcet tally (Condorcet, 1785) , as shown by Young (1986.) Both procedures utilize information provided by a voter's preference rankings of alternatives. The Borda Count uses this information by weighting a voter's preferences inversely to rank; the Condorcet tally proceeds by conducting pairwise comparisons between all alternatives. Outcomes from both procedures are highly correlated (Richards, 2005 .) Here we have favored the Condorcet procedure because instabilities in outcomes are made explicit when no alternative can be found that will beat all others. Indeed, as shown in Fig. 1 , if individuals cast votes haphazardly without constraint on their preference rankings of alternatives, then typically NO Condorcet winner will be found. This finding is inconsistent with real life scenarios, implying that voters indeed have shared models about how alternatives in the choice set are related. The primary focus of our research has been to explore how perturbations 6 in any shared model of the domain (or equivalently, the individuals' belief structures) will disrupt consensus. to his ideal point ai. For example, given this particular model M,, if an agent's first choice is a 3 , then equally preferred second choices will be a,, a 2 and a 4 will be the least desirable choice. Thus each agent has a (weak) preference ordering over the alternatives in the choice set, induced from the shared global model, M,.
(Details are discussed elsewhere: Richards et al 1998 Richards et al , 2002 Richards 2005.) 
Definitions and Notation
Let w = (w I... w) be the normalized weights over the n preference types --i.e., wi is the proportion of voters with ideal point ai and thus the proportion of voters with the partial order Di over the set of alternatives A. Let I aj > ak I denote 0 the number of voters for whom aj is preferred to ak. Then an alternative aj E A is the alternative most preferred by the group if for all ak E A, ak =/= aj, I aj > akl > I ak > a.). Hence, aj is the top-ranked alternative or, more simply, "the winner". The Condorcet tally method, which evaluates all pairs of alternatives, is used to find this winner.
Very often in noisy contests, there will not be a Condorcet winner. Rather, one alternative aj may beat ak in a pair-wise comparison, but ak is beaten by ai, which in turn beats aj. If either aj, aj, or ak also beat all remaining n-3 alternatives, 0 then there is a top-cycle and no winner. We call such outcomes unstable.
Stability (or conversely, the instability of an outcome): For a fixed set of 6 alternatives and model Mn, the stability of an outcome is the probability that there will not be a top-cycle, or, equivalently, that there will be a unique Condorcet winner (excluding ties.)
Not to be confused with the stability is the robustness of an outcome. For example, an outcome may not include top-cycles, but still be very sensitive to the choice of weights, or to the particular form of the model M,.
Robustness:
The robustness of an outcome is the likelihood that perturbations in the 0 edge set for model Mn, or fluctuations in the weights on alternatives will lead to a different winner.
Note that stability measures the ease with which an outcome can be overturned by another alternative, whereas robustness tests whether or not the same outcome will 0 be reached following some perturbation.
2.3 Methods: Our results are largely based on Monte Carlo simulations. The procedure is to construct a connected graph with n vertices and edge probability • p. (For most of these simulations, p = 1/2.) In the ideal case, with no "noise" and faithful voting, the random graph (i.e. the model Mn ) determines the set of n feasible preference orders, with each preference order assigned a weight wi, i = 1,....n, drawn uniformly from the interval [0,10001. These weights create an ntuple wi representing the distribution of voters over feasible preferences. We then • evaluate all pairs of alternatives to determine whether one alternative beats all others using the Condorcet tally. The number of trials varied between 200 and 500 depending upon the probability of no-winner. Because of the high correlation between the Borda and Condorcet winners, (>90%), the presence of Condorcet top-cycles gives a good indication of the likelihood that a Borda winner can be overturned. The maximum average error in the results is about 3 percent.
Robustness
Robustness impacts stability analysis in two ways: (i) the choice of tally procedure and (ii) the relative roles of model M, compared with weight variations on alternatives.
The simplest and most common method for choosing winners among a set of alternatives is simple Plurality, i.e. a winner-take-all. This procedure ignores any model relating alternatives, because the outcome is that alternative with the maximum number of votes (or here, equivalently, the maximum weight node in the graphical version of Mn.) The plurality winner need not be a majority winner, and in extreme cases will garner only as few percent of the total votes. Not surprisingly, this winner will be very easy to overturn, and hence is not robust. In contrast, the Condorcet and Borda procedures favored here are quite robust to variations in voting strengths if there is some modicum of relationships among alternatives (Young 1986 .) These two procedures are highly correlated (>90%) with the most likely winner being that alternative receiving the most support from many similar alternatives. Hence variations in voting strengths for one alternative become diluted with much less impact. Elsewhere we have documented the robustness of the Borda and Condorcet tallies over the more common winnertake-all Plurality methods. (Richards & Seung 2004 , Richards, 2005a " "different models, 80 same wigts S To further reinforce the importance of model Mn in a choice domain, rather than weights on alternatives, consider Figure 3 . In this figure, the two curves differ in whether the structure of the domain model is altered, or whether the weights on vertices (alternatives) are changed. Again, as will be inferred unless otherwise noted, weights that voters place on vertices in M, are chosen from a uniform distribution, and the graphical model Mn with n vertices is a random graph with all edges bi-directional with edge probability of one-half. The directed graphs Di governing a voter's preference orders are limited to the ideal point and its neighbors in Mn, with all lower ranked preferences taken as equivalent (i.e. indifferent.) The open diamonds show that when the domain model is held fixed, 0 but a second set of weights on alternatives are chosen from a uniform distribution, there is little change in the percent of agreement in outcomes, which remains roughly constant at 40% for n <30 and 1/2<p<2/3. (This percent varies with level of "noise on weights" introduced, but still remains essentially flat over the indicated range.) In contrast, when the weights are held fixed, but applied to two different random models for Mn, there is a dramatic fall in agreement between the two winners (gray triangles.)
Finding #1: The shared model Mn plays a dominant role in robustness of outcomes.
Elsewhere we have shown that for n>10 the expected agreement in Condorcet outcomes declines linearly with the number of vertices in Mn that are revised. Specifically, the relation is (n-k)/n, where k is the number of vertices in • Mn whose edge sets have been altered (Richards, 2005b.) This finding has led to an insight regarding the relation between measures of prediction of outcomes (d') and the information content of a graphical model, to be described briefly in section 6.0.
Perturbing the Graphical Model

Directional edges for Mn (Digraphs)
The lowest curve in Fig. 1 (open circles) shows the power of the shared model Mn in helping to achieve consensus: the chance of no winner is less than 5%. Hence model Mn provides enormous stability in outcomes, because the likelihood of no-winner is small. We now relax the constraints imposed on Mn• Let us continue to require that each voter's preference ordering on alternatives be fixed. However, the shared model Mn with bi-directional edges S will be replaced by a new form of Mn with directed edges. (The Di's as before will be limited to three levels as in Fig. 2 .) The perturbation is equivalent to choosing edges at random from a uniform distribution of all nC 2 *2 edges.
The top curve in Fig. 4 (filled squares) shows the probability of top-cycles when all voters rearrange their edges in Mn, choosing new neighbors from a uniform distribution of (n-l) vertices. (Hence for p = 1/2, about one-half (0.4) of the links between vertices will be bi-directional.) For this condition, note the maximum of roughly 20% compared with only 4% of top cycle outcomes for the ideal bi-directional Mn (lowest curve.) Significantly, unlike random noise on alternative weights, as the number of alternatives becomes large, the odds for no unique winner become small. Number ci Alternatives with directed edges has a disturbing effect on the probability of consensus and the effect is roughly equivalent to all voters mismatching one relationship.
Finding #2: A random assignment of directional edges in the shared domain model Mn raises the probability of no winner by about 5-fold, as compared with a random assignment of bi-directional edges. Hence consensus favors groups where voters see relationships in the domain in a reciprocal fashion. 6
Subgroups of Voters who violate M.
Here we explore further the condition where most of the population will agree on a model for the domain and vote accordingly, but a smaller segment will have beliefs and preference orders inconsistent with the shared model held by the majority. As before, the manipulation is for each individual to vote their first choice but otherwise choose alternatives arbitrarily during each tally, ignoring the shared model M,. The fraction of haphazard votes cast will be the main independent variable. Obviously, as the number of haphazard votes increases, the 0 probability of no-winner will also increase (see Figs. 1 & 4.) We can increase the odds for such negative outcomes in two ways: (i) by adding more uncertain (or rogue) voters who always vote haphazardly, or (ii) by distributing the haphazard votes across all voters. As will be shown, one set of curves predicts the unsuccessful outcome in both cases. 41 The solid curves in Fig. 5 show the probability of no Condorcet winner when varying amounts of noise or uncertainty is distributed uniformly across all voters, for all choices other than their first choice. Each curve represents the result for different random graphs having vertices ranging from 3 to 100, with edge probability of one-half. These results are rather insensitive to whether the random graph is sparse or dense, specifically for edge probabilities ranging from 1/4 to 3/4. Note that the slope of the curves is about one over most of the range, with the percent no-winner proportional to the uncertainty for a random graph of known size n. As the size, n, of these graphs increases, so does the 0 effects of uncertainty or noise in the aggregation process. The translation from one curve to another is approximately O(n 2 ) as n increases.
Finding #3: Even a small percent of haphazard votes (e.g. 10%) can have severe consequences on achieving successful outcomes for choice sets larger than 0 twelve alternatives.
We turn next to the dashed lines in Fig 5. These summarize results when a small group of voters are uncertain, and vote haphazardly 100% of the time. (Recall that the voting power for any type of voter is chosen from a uniform distribution of weights.) For a single type of rogue voter among a group of four types (alternatives), the effect on the outcome will be equivalent to distributing
The noise over 25% of the total votes cast. Hence the dashed curve labeled "1 voter" crosses the 4-alternative solid curve at a point directly above 25% noise on the abscissa, corresponding to about 12% no-winners in each case. Similarly, if there are eight different voter types (i.e. a random graph relating eight alternatives), then the same dashed line labeled "1 voter" will cross the 8-alternative solid curve directly above 1/8 = 12% noise, corresponding to about Numbers indicate size of random graph 22% no winners whether or not the noise is concentrated in one type of voter, or distributed across all voters. For three voters, the calculation is similar, simply finding the noise equivalent if all rogue voter's votes were distributed across all voters. The lowest dashed curve labeled 1/2-voter corresponds to one voter who votes haphazardly 50% of the time.
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Finding # 4: Regardless whether a fixed number of uncertain votes are cast as a block for one or more alternatives, or distributed over all voters, the disruption of consensus will be the same.
Haphazard votes for third or less desired alternative
One might expect in practice that uncertainty will increase for less preferred alternatives. In other words, given two alternatives being compared, if these alternatives are third or fourth ranked in an voter's preference ordering, uncertainty over which to favor should be much higher than for the first and 
P~l -• I
---second choices. Consider then voters who introduce noise only if both of the two alternatives being contested are third or higher choices. Thus in the shared domain model, the voter's first choice or ideal point is not adjacent to the two contested alternatives. Fig. 6 shows the results are dramatically different from the previous case presented in section 4.2 and Fig. 5 . First, although only results for 40 vertex random graphs are shown, the size of the graph (n > 10) makes little difference in the main effect. Rather, unlike the earlier results, here the edge probability of M. (or G,) drastically changes the relations between voter uncertainty and the probability of no winner. For highly connected random graphs [ p(e) -> 1 ], noise is ineffectiveas expected as the graphical covering becomes complete. Whereas for sparse graphs such as chains, an almost trivial amount of noise or uncertainty can create a high probability of no-winners.
We also see a rather pleasing correlation between the edge probability of Mn (i.e. Gn) and the asymptotic slope of the relation between no-winners and uncertainty or noise. As the noise approaches zero, the slopes of the curves are (1-p)/p for edge probability p. The cases for p = 1/2 and p = 1 illustrate. When p = 1, the slope is zero; whereas for p = 1/2 the asymptotic slope is one.
Finding # 5: The sparseness of Mn (i.e the edge probability in Gn) has very significant effects on consensus when uncertainty in voting occurs only for third or less desirable options.
Note: further related results appear in Richards, 2005a.
Information and d'
In the course of exploring similarity measures between two different graphical models, a relation between Shannon Information content (in bits) and Signal Detection measures (d') was discovered. Although such a relation has been sought since the 60's, there is no convincing proposal (Luce, 2003) , excepting that of Birdsall (1955) where the criterion Beta was specified for several different, quite specific situations. Our new insight comes from the study of how one individual, with his particular graphical model, might predict the choice of winner of another individual with a different graphical model. It can be shown that the false positives and misses of one's ability to predict the other's responses are then equal, on the average. Thus, the hit rate can be translated into an information measure, without worry about the false positive rate, which is known. The theoretical framework we choose to prove this assertion is adapted from Ihler, Fisher & Willsky (2004) . The * key is to use the Kullbach-Leibler divergence as a dissimilarity distance between the two graphical models. Unfortunately, the write-up with John Fisher has been delayed. The target for an MIT Al Memo is November.
Finding #6: Our paper will answer a 40 yr old question of how d' and bits can be rigorously related. This result opens the door to assigning information measures (bits) to predictions about categorical assertions, and, indirectly, may provide a measure (in bits) for the significance of cognitive events. : Similarity between two graphical models is defined as the percent of vertces with edges in common. Diversityis the opmsi te: one minus similarity. The gra phs show how to ma mize diversity in indi vdual cognitive structures (represen ted as graphical mocels )while stll maintaining god communication between members of a groupof sizes 2, 3, and 5. The optma graphical similarity btween the memlbrs' models should be one-third (ie. diversity equals two-thirds.)
Another twist on this problem is when two parties wish to collaborate. Each party should bring to the partnership different perspectives (i.e. models), but at the same time they must interact without misunderstandings. Hence we have a tradeoff between the similarity of the two models needed for understanding (d' high) and the dissimilarity of the models which provides different perspectives (information content high.) Fig. 7 illustrates that an optimal solution is when the similarity between the graphical models is one-third, as measured by the fraction of vertices with different edge sets. (See Richards, 2005b for further details and elaborations.)
Neural Voting Machines
The Borda and Condorcet methods are maximum likelihood aggregation procedures for social decision-making under uncertainty (Young, 1986 .) The Borda method is easy to implement, requiring O[n] calculations, and always will yield a consensus, excepting ties. The Condorcet method is a tournament where each alternative is contested pairwise with all others. This method has the advantage of NOT yielding a winner if there is no clear majority winner, and, furthermore, places no arbitrary weights on lower ranked preferences. The clear disadvantage is that the pairwise comparisons require O[n 2 ] calculations. We have designed an approximate Condorcet algorithm that requires only O[n,k] calculations, where k can be as small as 12 for 60 alternatives, or 25 for 200. The algorithm is 97% accurate, and fails by misses, not false positives. In other words, almost invariably for random graphs, no winner is delivered when the * algorithm fails to produce the correct winner. Figure 8 shows the success rate of the algorithm for k = 4, 6, 8, and 12. Also shown is the percent of Borda winners that agree with the true Condorcet winner for Gn (roughly 90%.) Note that the approximation is quite good, and very efficient. 6 We have also designed a simple neural network that can carry out this calculation. It has only one more layer than the Borda network. The graphical model does not appear explicitly as we would visualize a graph. Rather, the edges of the graphical model are made explicit. This is necessary in order to capture a theoretical adjacency assertion needed to compute pair-wise winners. The edge assertions can also be cast as correlations between alternatives, thus opening possibilities for weighted edges in the graphical model, or for learning new relationships (Richards & Seung, 2004.) Finding #7: The major impact is probably in Theoretical Neuroscience. It is now clear that biological systems can indeed carry out information aggregation procedures that are much more optimal than the popular winner-take-all method.
7.0 Multimodal Dynamics: cross-modal clustering (M.H. Coen) Graphical models that represent similarity relations among alternatives lie at the heart of our research. How are these models learned?
A new answer to this question has been the result of Michael Coen's research. Rather than attempting to categorize (or cluster) data obtained from one type of source (i.e. one sensory modality), he cross-correlates information from two different modalities, with one modality "training" the other. Thus, the method is self-supervised. A simple example is the correlation in a video stream between the sounds the speaker utters and her lip movements. The data from both sources is unlabeled; in other words the input is simply two scatter plots of points (observations.) From these data, we wish to recover meaningful phonetic categories, or in this case, the vowels. Coen, 2005.) of information in the other, consistent with the evidence provided by the correlations. When viewed as belief systems, we see in Fig. 9 that context, here represented as the different slices, may change similarity relations on the one hand, but at the same time, data from different contexts can be used to learn the basic categories of the domain.
Finding #8: First self-supervised learning algorithm using multi-modal information.
Note: Thesis available October 05. For preliminary version see Coen 2005.
Implications of Research
Our findings show that successful outcomes in collective decision-making 4 are strongly dependent on the integrity and form of the model of the domain shared by the members of the group. Although we have modeled the belief structures of the domain as a graph, and have explored stability using Condorcet aggregation, we expect the results to generalize to other representational forms, 4 as well as to other tally procedures including non-democratic decision-making. Regarding the latter, one might regard the beliefs of group members subject to dictatorial rule as having little impact on the stability of the group. Our results, however, suggest otherwise, especially if the coherence of individual beliefs plays a role in group stability. If so, then even a small group of members can U create an environment that is potentially unstable, easily reaching a tipping-point (e.g. Fig. 7 .) Our findings thus impact not only the understanding of group decision-making, but also the stability of social networks, negotiations seen as collaborations, as well as collaborations between parties with differing belief 4 structures.
